Since the tragic incident at Columbine High School (Colorado) in 1999 forced law enforcement to reexamine its response to school shootings, tactics have continued to evolve. Responding officers no longer wait for SWAT teams to arrive and suit up before entering schools and other buildings to confront the suspects. Forming into a team, deciding on a tactical formation, and entering a building were seen as somewhat radical tactics at the time. However, they are simply borrowed tactics from the military and other law enforcement response processes, somewhat of a combination between infantry patrol tactics and hostage rescue tactics, fashioned for a specific purpose.
Police and sheriff departments found that while the tactics were a vast improvement over previous approaches to active shooter situations, it still took too long for a team of four or five officers to assemble. Thus, it became permissible, even recommended, that one or two officers would be sufficient to go into the building to deal with the threat to the public. The first officer on scene was given a great deal of decision-making power, to include the decision of when and where to go in. While four or five officers remained the “ideal” number in a team, the number could be smaller based on the situation at hand and the officers’ training and abilities. Statistics tended to show that the sooner officers arrived on scene, the sooner the incident ended, often with the suspect’s life ended by his or her own hands.
Eventually, word spread about law enforcement’s changing tactics, and shooters used this knowledge to their advantage. They became aware that schools would go into a lockdown mode and that law enforcement officers would no longer wait outside. Suspects, such as Seung-Hui Cho at Virginia Tech, planned for the more immediate law enforcement response and barricaded doors to stall entry by officers.
With what seems like an ever-increasing number of active shooter incidents occurring, training is being stepped up. Departments are training for immediate response. In regular training sessions, officers are forming into teams and conducting force-on-force simulations. Schools are reexamining their emergency policies, as well.
Having responded to the scene of a school shooting a few years ago, the writer has seen how a lockdown works and the results of an active shooter call going out throughout a county. Nearly one hundred officers and deputies responded to the scene within about 20 minutes. While agencies practice the Incident Command System (ICS), developing plans and organizing more than 100 first responders under a great deal of stress are daunting tasks in the moment. That being said, it is much easier to work with a preplanned event versus react to an emergency.
The conventional wisdom, unfortunately, points out that it is not a matter of if the next incident of mass violence will occur, but when. Many critical incidents target innocent, defenseless people. With that logic in mind, it is cogent to recognize that these critical incidents will continue to occur at U.S. schools and other similar targets. Therefore, all U.S. agencies need to plan for these incidents in advance.
Development of a “Tactical Playbook”
The Pacifica, California, Police Department has 11 schools in its jurisdiction. In order to develop plans for these schools in the event of an active shooter incident, the department’s SWAT officers and active shooter instructors were assigned to schools. The officers then performed scouting missions on each of the schools as if they had to respond to an active shooter incident. In these scenarios, the officers were to assume that the following things had occurred or would most likely take place:
n There would be one or more suspects actively trying to seriously injure or kill people.
n The schools would go into a lockdown mode.
n All available first responders from within the county would be responding to the scene.
n Numerous parents and other members of the public, including the press, would be responding to the scene.
n Landline and cellular telephone systems might become overloaded and inoperable.
In conducting these scouting missions, officers attempted to identify the needs of first responders to critical incidents at the schools. A more effective response will be facilitated through the use of response packages for each school site. While tactical situations will vary, the packages are available as a starting point for incident management. The plan in each package also outlines roles and expectations of schools and other facilities.
Site Survey—Each police response package contains a brief description of the school, its relative location, designated locations for command posts and staging areas, floor plans with utility shutoff locations, and various photographs. In the process of putting this together, officers also conducted a threat assessment for the school. Officers examined the schools’ emergency response plans as well as physical security measures.
Active Shooter/Immediate Deployment Protocol—First responders adhere to the county-wide Active Shooter/Immediate Deployment protocol. They give consideration to the fact that parents may respond to the scene and that perimeters and traffic control will also need to be established quickly.
Lockdowns—The affected school or other facility will go into a lockdown mode per its policy; however, other schools in the area should also be warned to go into a precautionary lockdown or “secure campus” mode in which exterior access is restricted.
n Affected Site: First responders will expect that the site will be in a lockdown mode. This means that classroom and office doors will be locked, lights will be turned off, and students and school employees will be hidden from sight. If students or employees are in open areas or outside when an incident begins (e.g., gunshots or explosions are heard inside the building) and the adult supervisor or employee believes the safest course of action is to gather students and employees and move to a safe location off site, that action should be strongly considered.
Should students or employees be confronted by an individual intent on doing them harm (e.g., a shooter breaks into a locked classroom or students or employees are unable to hide or escape), based on their capabilities, they should consider taking defensive measures or taking action to distract the suspect.
n Securing Offices and Classrooms: All doors to offices and classrooms should be locked. It is preferable to have locking mechanisms that can be activated from inside the rooms. Blinds or shades should be closed, and lights should be turned out. Doing this will reduce the suspect’s ability to see inside the rooms. Employees and students should also avoid hiding in areas within view of windows. Also, hiding under desks might not be the best place to hide.
If people inside a room are in need of immediate first aid and no one inside the room is capable of performing first aid, a red placard may be placed in a corridor window where it will be easily visible to first responders. First responders are trained to be aware of red placards, and the use of these placards will expedite the process of getting aid to those who need it. Other placards may also be used, such a green card to indicate no immediate aid is needed in a room.
Room occupants should also consider taking additional measures to barricade doors. This can be done by using ropes, belts, extension cords, or similar items to tie outward-opening doors shut. Desks and chairs may also be placed inside the doorway. Should first responders want to gain access into a room, they will knock and announce their presence. Codes have been developed for use between school staff and first responders. This process will be used to confirm the identities of those on the other side of the door.
n Nearby Sites: Schools and facilities located in nearby buildings will be advised of the situation by police dispatch. Students at those outlying schools should be brought indoors, and exterior gates and doors should be secured. This lockdown does not have to be of the same degree as at the affected site, but aids in campus or building security should the incident spread beyond the initial incident location.
Road Closures—Road closures have been pre-designated with a suggested number of officers to maintain traffic control. Officers will be responsible for redirecting traffic, and they might also have to deal with responding parents. Parents shall be directed to the Sister School location. The locations of the street closures have also been given to the public works department so that if an incident does happen, they can assist more easily.
Command Posts—The location of the initial Incident Command Post (ICP) is suggested in the plan, but it can be moved at the officers’ discretion. Once the campus and crime scenes are secure, the ICP may be closed and operations moved to the more permanent Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
The ICP should be operated using Incident Command System (ICS) principles with a unified command consisting of police, fire and EMS, and school or building officials.
Staging Areas—Responding personnel should be directed away from the ICP. Separate areas are designated for personnel, and officers or fire personnel shall provide for orderly parking of vehicles and check-in of personnel.
“Sister School” Designations—Administrators from the various public and private schools have all agreed in principle to the Sister School concept. Should an active shooter or similar incident occur at a school, it is critical that responding parents stay away so as not to become victims themselves or inhibit emergency response and investigation of the incident. Therefore, parents will be directed via recorded message (from the school district) or by officers to go to a designated school where they will be taken to an assembly area and briefed by school district and police personnel. The Sister School will then serve as the student-parent reunification location as students are moved from the affected school.
Incident Response
Depending on the nature of the incident at the school or other building, the lockdown may last for several hours. Schools should have means to provide for the basic personal necessities of those who will be under lockdown inside classrooms. As the building is searched, classrooms and portions of the building may be released in a controlled manner. If the site is a school, this release will be coordinated with school officials to provide for accountability of students before those students are taken to the Sister School for reunification with their parents. Children should be released to their parents as soon as practical.
Law enforcement’s tasks during an immediate deployment to an active shooter or active threat incident will be to locate and use appropriate means to address the threat to the public. Law enforcement will then work with fire and EMS to locate those who may be injured and move them to safe areas for treatment. Finally, law enforcement will conduct a thorough search of the incident area in an effort to locate other suspects or items that might pose a threat to the public. This process might take several hours, during which time the lockdown will remain in effect. Certain areas of the building designated as crime scenes may remain closed for an extended period of time to provide for evidence collection and crime scene reconstruction.
Summary
First responders can work in advance with school districts to establish protocols, helping to ensure the response to critical incidents can be more manageable. To varying degrees, protocols should be accessible to all responding agencies and departments. Copies of plans can be stored in shared electronic networks and kept in hard-copy form in vehicles. While neighboring law enforcement agencies should have full access to plans, school districts don’t need to know law enforcement’s tactics. They need to know what to expect, though, and what their responsibilities are in these situations. Likewise, public works departments don’t need to know tactics, but providing these agencies with the locations of street closures and meeting points can take a sizeable load off the plate of incident commanders. When first responders put in a moderate amount of work ahead of time, valuable time and effort can be saved later, and, thus, lives.d
Please cite as
Joe Spanheimer, “Active Shooter Response: Developing a Tactical Playbook,” Police Chief online, December 5, 2018.
