Law enforcement professionals know intuitively and demonstrably that criminals prey on the most vulnerable of their neighbors. It is their very vulnerability that makes them attractive to someone seeking to take something from them, whether that is their property, the sovereignty of their body, or their freedoms. Law enforcement leaders should also appreciate intuitively that the marginalization of these neighbors—lack of access, agency, representation, and participation in crucial processes—increases marginalization which, in turn, increases vulnerability and leads to a greater potential for victimization. Anything that contributes to the marginalization of these at-risk neighbors will contribute to their vulnerability and increase their exposure to crime and victimization. When neighbors do not feel they have access to justice and the criminal justice system or that access does not lead to positive outcomes for them, they will stop engaging. This lack of engagement further contributes to their vulnerability.

If neighbors don’t report crime or fear, police cannot respond to the incidents or the feelings, be they individual or aggregate. If neighbors don’t share what they experience, the police cannot know what they are going through and cannot help them. This is what is meant when procedural justice talks about the necessity to embody fairness, transparency, voice, and impartiality in the processes that resolve disputes and allocate resources. Without trust in processes, neighbors won’t engage. Lack of inclusion and appreciation can lead to distrust, which can lead to not engaging with the police that leads to police being unable to address crime and safety issues, which, in turn, leads, Möbius strip–like, back to distrust. And the cycle repeats.

Consequently, one of the most important things the police can do to uphold their sacred obligation to help their neighbors be safe and feel safe is to work deliberately to make everyone feel they are represented, that they are included, that they are valued, that they have a voice, and that they have agency in the processes that affect their safety. The journey to that eventuality begins with embracing diversity, inclusion, and equity in law enforcement’s people, policies, and practices.

On July 10, 2020, in the wake of the brutal murder of U.S. Army Specialist Vanessa Guillen by a fellow soldier, the Secretary of the Army announced the formation of the Fort Hood Independent Review (FHIR) Committee to “determine whether the command climate and culture at Fort Hood, and the surrounding military community, reflects Army values, including respect, inclusiveness, and workplaces free from sexual harassment.”¹ The independent review committee was composed of five individuals including an FBI agent, two U.S. Military Academy graduates/attorneys, a retired Judge Advocate General (JAG), and a retired U.S. Marine Corps intelligence analyst and current veterans services professional. This committee was supported by five former FBI agents. The committee and core advisory panel did not include any local law enforcement, victim advocates, or gender bias experts. However, the Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee (FHIR Report) indicates the committee met with civil rights organizations, sheriffs and chiefs of police, state and federal Police, district attorneys, and mayors but does not note engagement of any victim services or women’s rights groups.

Final Report & Findings

The U.S. Army recently issued the final FHIR Report.² The murder of Specialist Guillen, though it occurred in association with a military organization, has important lessons for police leaders. In this case the victim was both a neighbor and a member of the organization. What follows is a detailed exploration of how the U.S. Army failed Specialist Guillen as a team member. It also highlights what can be done to improve policy, processes, and culture to protect current and future neighbors and team members. In doing so, it provides valuable insight to police leaders determined to protect the most vulnerable in their organizations and communities.

In any organizational culture, but particularly highly structured and hierarchical ones like the military and police, the expression, modeling, and support of core values by leadership and command staff have tremendous impact on the behavior of the organization’s members. According to the FHIR Report, Army leadership demonstrably failed in this fundamental aspect:

[N]o Commanding General or subordinate echelon commander chose to intervene proactively and mitigate known risks of high crime, sexual assault and sexual harassment.

[T]he Sexual Assault Review Board (SARB) process was primarily utilized to address administrative and not the actual substantive aspects of the Program.

Most of all, it lacked command emphasis.³

There exists a leadership and accountability maxim that what leaders permit, they promote, and that sentiment echoes in the observations and findings of the FHIR Report.

“It lacked command emphasis.”

This succinct statement means leadership did not fundamentally articulate, demonstrate, and reinforce the importance of eliminating sexual harassment and sexual violence as a core value. In the best of circumstances, the decision to report sexual harassment and sexual assault is fraught with obstacles and perils for the victim. Those obstacles and perils loom larger and more significantly in an environment that significantly controls both the victim’s professional and personal life as is the case with the military . In these situations, it is particularly incumbent on leadership to implement values, policies, and procedures that provide a safe environment for reporting sexual harassment and sexual assault and instill an unshakeable belief that such reports will be believed, taken seriously, investigated, and addressed.

Many of the findings in the FHIR Report reinforce what is already known about sexual violence. As many as one in five women have experienced sexual assault in their lifetime.⁴ The rate of sexual assault can be even higher among specialized populations such as military service members.⁵ Almost all perpetrators of sexual violence are male, and very few sexual assault victims are sexually assaulted by a stranger.⁶ These factors—increased risk to military service members, an almost exclusively male perpetrator population (in an organization where women make up only about 15 percent of the total), and high prevalence of sexual assault by known offenders—highlight the military as a uniquely high-risk environment.⁷ More specifically, Fort Hood was identified as a high-risk installation for sexual assault as far back as 2014, and, in 2018, was understood to have a risk of female gender discrimination at a level of 5 (of 5).⁸ Despite this, the FHIR Report found, “There was a conspicuous absence of an effective risk management approach to crime incident reduction and soldier victimization.”⁹

“It lacked command emphasis.”

Very few victims disclose sexual assaults, with no more than 1/5 of victims ever reporting their rape to law enforcement.¹⁰ Victims may fear reporting because they fear retaliation by the perpetrator, they are ashamed or embarrassed, or do not trust law enforcement to do anything.¹¹ Victims all-too-often lack trust and confidence that the system will treat them with respect and dignity and will pursue the crimes against them with belief and vigor. The FHIR Report reinforces this reality, reporting there was a universal fear of retaliation, exposure, and ostracism for reporting sexual harassment and rape with less than 50 percent of enlisted service members in one brigade reporting they felt free from the fear of retaliation.¹² The FHIR Report summarized this environment as “victims feared the inevitable consequences of reporting: ostracism, shunning and shaming, harsh treatment, and indelible damage to their career.”¹³ Many soldiers even recounted times when a victim was punished by being given extra duties.¹⁴ Additionally, the report reinforced existing data and research that show the fear of false reporting is almost completely unwarranted. Specifically, the FHIR Report states it did not find, “a single substantiated report from a soldier on the receiving end of an invented… report.”¹⁵

As a result of the review, 14 Army officials at Fort Hood were either fired or suspended, including several high-ranking leaders.¹⁶ Additionally, the FHIR Report makes nine core findings including:

• • There was a failure to instill… core values attributable to a lack of commitment and leadership—spanning not one single command, but a series of commands. The Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention (SHARP) program is structurally flawed and inadequately implemented and supported.¹⁷
  • Criminal investigations had various inefficiencies including too few agents, too little experience, overtasked agents, and excessively long investigations.
  • Sexual harassment and sexual assault adjudication processes involved degrading confidence; specifically, victims were not kept informed and not given notice of victim rights.
  • The command climate was permissive of sexual harassment and sexual assault.

The FHIR Report also makes 70 recommendations including, notably:

• • The Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention program should be placed outside the chain of command.
  • Army needs to develop a cadre of pooled full-time victim advocates.
  • Army needs to increase number of appointed special victim counselors.
  • Each sexual assault and sexual harassment case should be tracked and monitored with quarterly reports on status.
  • All SHARP program disciplinary actions should be published at least semiannually, without identifying the subject, victim, or unit, in order to deter future conduct and engender confidence in the SHARP response process.
  • Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) should maintain a sufficient number of experienced special agents.

Leadership & Accountability

The FHIR Report clearly states the Army needs further guidance to all ranks on what behavior is unacceptable and will not be tolerated of any professional soldier.¹⁸ The FHIR Report’s findings, recommendations, and the consequences to failed leadership are a good start. The Army should be commended for its action and transparency. However, there is more that can and should be done. The FHIR Report clearly states,

Leadership is, and will remain, at a loss to address the crime problems affecting the health, safety and welfare of its Soldiers… without a comprehensive, intelligence driven, proactive strategy to address the crime issues facing its command.¹⁹

This is undoubtedly true. There are a number of actions that can be implemented or reinforced to improve support of victims of sexual harassment and assault.

• • Leadership will not be able to support victims in a trauma-informed and victim-focused way unless they deliberately engage those professionals and advocates whose job it is to support victims. Trauma-informed victim advocates help leadership implement and reinforce core values, policies, and practices that eliminate an environment where victims feel unsafe and sexual harassment and sexual assault can proliferate. The U.S. Army, like all organizations supporting victims of sexual assault, should engage professionally trained trauma-informed victim advocates.
  • The core values embodied in the SHARP program should be a critical component of the performance measures of every enlisted and commissioned supervisor and failure to aggressively support them should be detrimental to promotion and command. Decisions about the criminal investigation and prosecution of sexual harassment and sexual assault reports should be removed entirely from the chain of command.
  • All enlisted and commissioned supervisors should receive detailed and ongoing training on trauma-informed responses and how to support victims of sexual assault and harassment.
  • The Army should also aggressively implement programs to address the intersection of intimate partner violence and sexual violence.

All leaders need to be held responsible for creating a command climate and culture that reflects core values including respect, inclusiveness, and workplaces free from sexual harassment. Victims need and deserve the very best of an organization that justifiably prides itself on its leadership. In short, the epidemic of violence against women, both in the world at large and, specifically, in the military needs leadership that is biased toward action.

Meaningful Change

Meaningful changes in the culture and environment of the U.S. Army have the potential to support victims and reduce sexual harassment and sexual assault and other criminal victimizations. As career law enforcement and victim services professionals who specialize in supporting victims, improving responses to violence against women, and implementing trauma-informed practices, the authors reviewed the FHIR Report with great anticipation. Organizations such as End Violence Against Women International (EVAWI) and the IACP provide comprehensive training, resources, and support to organizations around the world seeking to improve their response to violence against women. These programs seek to improve outcomes for victims and pursue accountability for their assailants while protecting victims, preventing future attacks, and keeping communities safe. The authors envision a world where gender-based violence and harassment is unacceptable on every level—where victims receive the compassion, support, and justice they deserve. It is certain that the leadership of the U.S. Army and the broader military community share these values. Consequently, it is absolutely vital the U.S. Army engage professionals in local law enforcement and professional victim services to help them achieve their clearly articulated and commonly shared goals as highlighted here. It is also important to remember that this is not just an example of something in a unique organization and culture like the U.S. military. Policing shares many of the traits that made the military susceptible to the shortcomings highlighted in this analysis. Those traits include a culture that is traditionally male-dominated, hierarchal, insular and inward-facing, and often reluctant to admit problems and implement meaningful changes. Just as the U.S. military should be applauded for addressing these problems directly, police leaders should be encouraged to seek to learn from their experiences and implement similar improvements to policy, processes, and culture to ensure all team members and neighbors feel safe to report and address attacks on their well-being.

Notes:

¹U.S.Army, “Secretary of the Army Announces Independent Review of Fort Hood,” news release, July 10, 2020.

²Fort Hood Independent Review Committee (FHIRC), Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee (2020).

³FHRIC, “Executive Summary,” Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee.

⁴Kimberly A. Lonsway and Joanne Archambault, Dynamics of Sexual Assault: What Does Sexual Assault Really Look Like? (End Violence Against Women International, 2020), 41.

⁵Lonsway and Archambault, Dynamics of Sexual Assault, 44.

⁶Lonsway and Archambault, Dynamics of Sexual Assault, 48–50.

⁷Mary Dever, “With Historic Number of Women in Uniform, the Vet Community Is About to Change,” Military.com, March 11, 2019.

⁸FHRIC, Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee, 19–26.

⁹FHRIC, “Executive Summary,” Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee.

¹⁰Lonsway and Archambault, Dynamics of Sexual Assault, 18.

¹¹Lonsway and Archambault, Dynamics of Sexual Assault, 55–56.

¹²FHRIC, Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee, 27–28.

¹³FHRIC, “Executive Summary,” Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee.

¹⁴FHRIC, Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee, 39.

¹⁵FHRIC, Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee, 81.

¹⁶Johnny Diaz, Maria Cramer, and Christina Morales, “What to Know About the Death of Vanessa Guillen,” New York Times, April 30, 2021.

¹⁷Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention program (SHARP) purpose is to eliminate sexual assaults and sexual harassment by creating a climate that respects the dignity of every member of the Army family and includes the following additional goals: Reduce the stigma of reporting, Protect the victim, increase prevention, investigation, prosecution and victim care capabilities, increase training and resources, and refine and sustain response capability. U.S Army Garrison Japan, “Sexual Harassment Assault Prevention.”

¹⁸FHRIC, Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee, 113.

¹⁹FHRIC, Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee, 113.

Please cite as

Fred Fletcher, Caroline Huffaker, and Joanne Archambault, “A Response to the Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee,” Police Chief Online, August 18, 2021.