As leaders in the ever-evolving field of policing, police commanders have a duty and responsibility to share lessons learned with their peers. Such lessons can come from a variety of topics, and those learned from critical incidents are of great importance. Six critical incident lessons are offered herein to help agency leaders increase response preparedness and readiness.
Lesson 1: One Commander Cannot Do It All
Critical incidents quickly become chaotic and challenging to manage. The on-scene commander will be faced with numerous responsibilities from different angles and will have to manage multiple responding officer support units such as SWAT, K9, Traffic, and Patrol; coordinate interagency assistance; and keep their chain of command informed. Safety and accountability for all responding personnel must be a priority; one commander cannot do it all.1
As soon as it is possible, establish command posts and activate an Incident Command System (ICS) model. Additional command officers need to respond and assist the on-scene commander with the span of control, as this will grow very quickly.
As supporting personnel arrive, they will need direction on what is needed and where. Without a central command center, there is no organized response. And yes, initially, the command center may be the back of the commander’s vehicle. If deemed safe, a room within the grounds or a nearby area could also be utilized for tactical planning and deployment.
Lesson 2: Consider Self-Deployment vs. Self-Readiness
Self-initiated activity is an important part of effective policing, and, to be clear, it is necessary during the initial stages of a critical incident. Also known as the edge-of-chaos phase, this initial and volatile period of event initiation during a critical incident, such as an active shooting, needs urgent police action.2 Therefore, if police officers are near a critical incident emergency, they should respond and, if practical, advise.
The following points do not refer to the initial time period of a critical incident. It is important for both commanding officers and personnel to recognize and differentiate this chaotic period as a separate period from the emergency response.3 The question now is, after this period, how should officers respond?
Self-Deployment: Officers will want to respond to a critical incident—it is what officers do—but all are accountable for their own actions and to each other. In many instances, self-deployment has proven to be problematic. Too many officers overload radio systems, block emergency access, and limit resources for other potential emergencies.4 Think about the following:
- Why needlessly place responding officers in potential blue-on-blue situations? Should the worst occur, how does one explain it to a victim officer’s spouse, children, or parents?
- What if a self-deployed officer is off duty with no identifiable gear?
- What if the suspect is wearing camo or other patterns similar to the SWAT team?
- What if the initial critical incident is part of a planned effort to draw all resources to one area?
Self-Readiness: If an emergency is occurring near an officer’s location, then he or she should respond and, if practical, advise. Otherwise, officers should begin to self-ready. Not to be confused with self-deployment, think of “self-readiness” as preparation for deployment. For example, for a SWAT officer, self-ready will mean advising an immediate supervisor of a pending response order; gearing up; and, if appropriate, assembling with other on-duty SWAT members for unified travel to the incident. This is also the time to note who is responding and account for each responding member. Remember that individuals responding to a mutual aid call are not likely to be familiar with the area.
Lesson 3: Communications May Be Disrupted
Communications systems are effective—when they work. However, radio systems and cellular services are likely to overload when large numbers of first responders, family members, media, and others converge in one geographic area.5
As an example of how communications failures impact response, think about the nature of the Parkland, Florida, incident. This was an active shooter incident at a high school within a populated residential area. To make things worse, initial reports varied and included an unknown number of shooters and victims. There were also initial reports of a shooter with a gas mask, suggesting this was a very prepared killer. The point is that unverified information will flow from various sources, and only on-scene personnel will best be able to relay verifiable information. But how can that be done if communications fail?
Chiefs might consider obtaining multiband radios for their personnel that also feature radio-to-radio capabilities. If primary radio systems fail, a radio-to-radio or “point-to-point” feature may be the answer. Remember to inform personnel on how to access and operate these additional capabilities.
Lesson 4: Mutual Aid Requests Are Not Uniform
An official mutual aid request via dispatch communications may never come, as an on-scene commander may have too many other responsibilities to manage. Mutual aid requests could instead come via phone calls, face-to-face discussion, or other ways. An important point to remember is that assisting agencies should document who a request came from and what was requested and, most importantly, account for all responding support officers.
If there is an unconfirmed emergency at a nearby jurisdiction, depending on the nature of the incident, a supervisor or SWAT team leader should immediately respond to verify a need for mutual aid while other potential responders self-ready. This needs to occur as soon as possible so that verified information is relayed to responding personnel and to SWAT members prior to potential communications failures.
Lesson 5: First Responders Need Access
From the time of arrival to when the clearing process concludes, access for first responders must be considered. Perhaps a jurisdiction has experienced substantial growth or redevelopment over recent years. A downside is that growth and redevelopment result in modern structures with reinforced doors, impact windows, and other security measures that present new challenges for access during emergency responses. The following are a few suggestions to mitigate scene access challenges:
“Never lose sight that the preservation of life is the top priority and that critical incidents are just that—critical.”
Parking vehicles: When supporting officers arrive on scene, they must park in an orderly fashion leaving open access to the site of the emergency. This allows ambulances and other emergency vehicles to safely respond directly to the scene to assist victims. Those who fail to follow procedures will learn that armored vehicle operators will find a way to the emergency, regardless of what vehicles are blocking the access.
Additional keys: Sets of additional keys are beneficial to responding officers or SWAT teams as these prevent delays and allow smoother entries to buildings, rooms, closets, and other areas without the need for forced entries. Local schools and businesses should consider having multiple master key sets accessible for multiple teams of first responders, should they be needed during a critical incident. While police leaders may encounter resistance to this idea from local schools or businesses, it is essential to continue efforts toward a mutual agreement.
Knox boxes: Knox boxes are secured key boxes located on the outside of a structure, business, or school. These small boxes contain sets of master keys for buildings to facilitate a rapid response.6 Depending on jurisdictional protocols, local fire departments will usually have master keys within their rescue vehicles that open these boxes throughout the serviced area. Consider consulting with the local fire department to establish protocols for police access to Knox boxes during emergency responses.
Maps and floor plans: Does the agency retain maps and floor plans of major structures or vulnerable targets such as airports, shopping malls, schools, and hospitals on computer drives? Technology can fail at the worst times. Consider having laminated copies in patrol supervisors’ vehicles and SWAT vehicles. These should be reviewed and updated as necessary.
Lesson 6: Training Prepares Responses
Does the agency emphasize the important role that proper training has toward achieving strategic goals? Time and time again officers revert to their training during high-stress events. “The response to a threat is smoother because training causes the brain to observe and orient faster.”7
Policies: Does the agency have policies for critical incidents such as active shooter response, explosions, natural disasters, and other crises? Make these accessible to personnel and encourage supervisors to review them during line-ups and briefings. Consider becoming an accredited organization and explore resources from other organizations and associations to research trends and ensure best practices.
Diverse training: In addition to complying with mandates and standards, consider adding scenario-based training, supervisor trainings, online training, roll call training, or any other training methods within the agency’s means. These are the types of preparative strategic actions that make a difference on how a department responds to any type of incident.
Local sites: Training within local buildings helps familiarize personnel with particular sites in the jurisdiction. For example, a SWAT team can train at the local malls, schools, hospitals, businesses, and other sites. An additional benefit to these practices is that they are in line with community policing by encouraging dialogue and developing partnerships between local site representatives and agency personnel. When possible, try to include the site representatives in those trainings as they will have key roles during an emergency response. Personnel involved are more likely to develop partnerships with site representatives in this way and know what the expectations are likely to be during a critical incident.
Conclusion
Commanding officers have many responsibilities to deal with on a daily basis. However, they must never lose sight that the preservation of life is the top priority and that critical incidents are just that—critical—and often result in the loss of life. Commanding officers must continually prepare, assess resources, and learn from the lessons others have provided. They should seek out law enforcement publications, attend diverse leadership conferences, and train.
There are no “lessons learned” lists that cover it all. It is up to each and every commanding officer to constantly seek new information and promote a culture of preparedness. It is up to each one to better prepare for that day when a critical incident strikes.
Notes:
1 Larry S. Miller, Harry W. More, and Michael C. Braswell, Effective Police Supervision, 9th ed. (New York, NY: Routledge 2020).
2 Cynthia Renaud, “The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident Commanders How to Function in the Edge of Chaos,” Homeland Security Affairs 8, Article 8 (June 2012).
3Anna C. Brookes, Police Self-Deployment at Critical Incidents: A Wicked Problem or Part of the Solution? (masters’ these, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2017).
4Katie LaGrone, “EMS, Police Radio System ‘Overloaded’ during Early Moments of Florida School Shooting,” ABC News, February 16, 2018; Travis Norton, “Unraveling The Knot: Common Mistakes during Large-Scale Incidents and How to Overcome Them,” The Tactical Edge (Fall 2017): 30–35.
5LaGrone, “EMS, Police Radio System ‘Overloaded’ during Early Moments of Florida School Shooting”; Travis J. Brown, “Police Radio History and Innovation: What Have We Learned?” Journal of Law Enforcement 3, no. 6 (2014):1–8.
5Kitsey Burns Harrison, “New Ordinance Provides Peace-of-Mind for Business Owners,” Yadkin Ripple, August 18, 2016.
7Lindsey Bertomen, “In a High-Stress Situation, Training Takes Over,” Officer.com, November 19, 2009.
Please cite as
Jose J. Vargas, “Six Critical Incident Lessons Learned for Commanding Officers,” Police Chief Online, January 27, 2021.
